History of League Activity
The League has long felt that the laws of New York State inadequately define, monitor or discipline unethical behavior in the public sector, both on the part of public officials and lobbyists, those who seek to influence the behavior of public officials.
In reviewing various ethics and lobbying proposals. The League looks at three areas:
- What activity is prohibited and what disclosures are required;
- Are the penalties for violation sufficient to compel required disclosure and dissuade prohibited behavior;
- Is the enforcement body sufficiently empowered and nonpartisan to punish violators efficiently and effectively?
It has been the League’s position that a meaningful system of ethics and lobbying regulation must contain all three elements, for if any element is omitted the system will not function to achieve desired results.
Recommendations for additional prohibitions include:
- Ban pay to play (the process by which lobbyists and individuals with governmental business gain influence with legislators through campaign contributions, offers of outside employment to legislators and/or their family members;
- Strengthen the ban on the personal use of campaign contributions in accordance with federal standards.
Recommended disclosures include:
- Public on-line disclosure by legislators of all outside business interests, including disclosure of clients by lawyers and consultants;
- Public on-line disclosure by lobbyists of any business relationship they have with lawmakers;
- Public on-line disclosures of the financial backgrounds of public officers, with redaction only of information that is clearly private or confidential.
The League believes serious lobbying and ethics violations should be felonies.
The League believes the enforcement agency should have the following characteristics:
- At a minimum, jurisdiction over both the executive and legislative branches, unlike the split jurisdiction that currently exists;
- Nonpartisan, chosen by a designating commission for appointing members. No one elected official would make a majority of appointments to the designating commission;
- Staff independence, achieved by appointment of an Executive Director for a fixed term, removable only for cause;
- Independent and stable funding source, as opposed to relying on the legislature for support;
- Power to conduct random compliance audits and investigate complaints, including the power to issue subpoenas;
- Power to levy increased civil penalties and to collect such penalties through administrative action;
- Power to share information with other oversight and enforcement groups, including agencies that initiate criminal proceedings.
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